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PEOPLE V. HARLAN: THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT
TAKES A STEP TOWARD ELIMINATING RELIGIOUS
INFLUENCE ON JURIES
"An eye for an eye will only make the whole world blind."'
-Mahatma Gandhi
INTRODUCTION
Gandhi's familiar quote is a powerful response to the ancient
maxim "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.",2 Death penalty opponents
often cite Gandhi's quote to suggest that the death penalty is flawed and
should be abolished.3 Gandhi's quote reminds people that while Ameri-
can society allows the death sentence in murder cases, it does not do so
blindly. A death sentence is not part of a simple equation as "an eye for
an eye" suggests. Justice requires the courts to employ a rigorous, struc-
tured and exhaustive process before deciding whether a citizen must die
for the crime he or she committed.
The court placed Robert Harlan's life in the hands of the jury.4 The
court admonished the jury to follow a strict process.5 They were to listen
to the evidence, follow the court's legal instructions, apply a four-step
process, and not vote for the death penalty automatically. 6 A trial court
found that the jury had not followed the court's strict legal instructions.7
On appeal, the Colorado Supreme Court found that because jurors
brought Bibles into the jury deliberation room, and discussed biblical
passages such as "eye for an eye," the court could no longer trust that
neither "pride or prejudice" influenced the jury's verdict.8  Robert
1. See Gandhi Statue dedication Ceremony at Hermann Park (Oct. 2, 2004),
http://www.indianembassy.org/amb/ambgandhi-houston_04.htm.
2. The idea of an "eye for an eye" can be found in the Bible in Leviticus 24:20. It has been
traced, however, to other ancient sources, most notably the Code of Hammurabi. See CODE OF
HAMMURABI § 196 (Robert Francis Harper ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 2d. ed. 1904) (about
1750 B.C.).
3. See, e.g., The Oklahoma Coalition to Abolish the Death Penalty,
http://www.ocadp.org/speakers.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2005).
4. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
5. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 629-30.
6. Id. at 620.
7. Id. at 619-20 ("The trial court concluded that there was a reasonable possibility that use of
the Bible in the jury room to demonstrate a requirement of the death penalty for the crime of murder
would have influenced a typical juror to reject a life sentence for Harlan.").
8. See id. at 633 (referring to COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-11-103(b)(2005) which requires the
Colorado Supreme Court to overturn death penalty conviction is the sentence was imposed due to
pride of prejudice).
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Harlan's sentence was overturned and he was re-sentenced to life without
the possibility for parole. 9
The circumstances in People v. Harlan were not unique. Advocates
on both sides of the issue frequently cite biblical passages and religious
arguments.1l However, challenges to sentences allegedly tainted by re-
ligion "often face formidable state evidentiary hurdles and rarely result in
mistrials or reversals."" Harlan is unique because it is a rare example
where a court has concluded that there was a sufficient likelihood that
religion could have had a prejudicial effect on the outcome of the jury's
deliberation. 12
The court's decision sparked a harsh reaction from conservative and
religious groups. Colorado Governor, Bill Owens, reacted by stating,
"[t]oday's decision is demeaning to people of faith and prevents justice
from being served .... 13 The decision inspired one commentator to
write, "[i]n sum, the anti-religious principle of Harlan categorically con-
demns a juror whose morality is informed by religion. God is dead, at
least in the chambers of the Colorado Supreme Court."' 4 The court's
decision was understandably controversial; however, to claim that the
decision was anti-religious is a mischaracterization. The decision in
Harlan only prohibits the physical presence of the Bible in the jury de-
liberation room.' 5
In Part I, this article will discuss the facts of Harlan and how the
Colorado Supreme Court came to its decision. In addition, it will discuss
the Sixth and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals' decisions in Arnett v.
Jackson'6 and United States v. Bakker' 7 respectively. In Part II, the arti-
cle will compare Arnett and Bakker to Harlan and discuss emerging
standards courts have applied when analyzing religious influences in
sentencing decisions. The article will then consider whether the Colo-
rado Supreme Court was correct to assert that we live in a religious soci-
ety that could be prejudiced by the presence of the Bible. Next, the arti-
cle will discuss the court's narrow holding in light of the arguments
made in Justice Rice's dissent. Part III will analyze the trial court's deci-
sion to impeach the jury's verdict, and dismiss the protection afforded by
9. Id. at 617.
10. Gary J. Simson & Stephen P. Garvey, Knockin on Heaven's Door: Rethinking the Role of
Religion in Death Penalty Cases, 86 CORNELL L. REv., 1090, 1092 (2001).
11. Id. at 1121.
12. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 619-20.
13. Court: Jurors Erred by Consulting Bible in Death Penalty Case, CHRISTIAN CENTURY,
Apr. 19, 2005, at 16, available at 4/19/05 CHRSTNCTY 16 (Westlaw) [hereinafter Jurors Erred].
14. Bruce Fein, Purging Religious Influence, WASH. TIMES, April 19, 2005, at A14. The
author makes the argument that the spoken word is more powerful than the written word. See id.
15. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 632.
16. 393 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2004).
17. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
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Rule 606(b). 18 Finally, in Part IV, this article will predict how the court
would have ruled if the verdict had been challenged on Establishment
Clause grounds.
In conclusion, this article will suggest ways courts and lawmakers
could modify the conditions of jury deliberation and jury instructions in
an effort to ensure defendants receive sentences free from prejudice. The
Colorado Supreme Court and other courts across the country attempt to
strike a balance between respecting religious views and limiting religious
influence in the courtroom. 19 Courts are asking, "How much religion
should we tolerate?" The Colorado Supreme Court in People v. Harlan
20
has taken a step towards answering that question: no Bibles in the jury
deliberation room.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Colorado Supreme Court's Decision in People v. Harlan
21
In 1995, a jury convicted Robert Eliot Harlan of raping and murder-
ing Rhonda Maloney and of shooting Jaquie Creazzo He shot Jaquie
Creazzo as she attempted to rescue Rhonda Maloney; the injury Jacquie
Creazzo suffered left her paralyzed for life.2 3 Then, he seized Maloney
and savagely beat, raped, and killed her.24 The jury sentenced Robert
Harlan to death, and the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the verdict.
25
Subsequently, Harlan brought a motion to vacate his death sentence
due to jury misconduct.26 Harlan alleged that jurors brought Bibles into
the jury room during deliberations and the Bibles presented them to
"demonstrate... authoritative passage[s] commanding imposition of the
death penalty. 27 The trial judge frequently warned the jury to ignore
any and all extraneous information, 28 and told the jury that they were to
consider the evidence brought forward by the trial and "nothing else
whatsoever., 29 The court instructed the jury that Colorado law requires
that they follow the instructions and guidelines the court had given.
30
Specifically, the court told the jury that their verdict could not be "the
18. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 625.
19. See cases cited supra notes 16-17.
20. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 616.
21. 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
22. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 618.
23. Id. at 618.





29. Id. The court also warned the jury not to discuss the case with anyone, not to watch any-
thing on television about the case, and to have someone scan the newspaper before they did to make
sure they did not see anything that concerned the criminal justice system. See id.
30. See id.
2005] 615
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result of passion, prejudice or other irrational or arbitrary emotional re-
sponse."3'
In an instruction that the dissent would later rely upon in its opinion,
the court directed the jury that their decision to impose a death sentence
would require them to "apply [their] reasoned judgment in deciding
whether the situation calls for life imprisonment or the imposition of the
death penalty., 32 The jury would "still make a further individual moral
assessment of whether [they have] been convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt that the death penalty ... is appropriate. 33  Finally, the jury
"should attempt to arrive at a reasoned judgment as to whether [they]
have been convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating fac-
tors do no outweigh the aggravating factor or factors. 34
Three months after the jury sentenced Harlan to death, a defense
counsel investigator interviewed five members of the jury. 35 The jurors
revealed the physical presence and discussion of the Bible during the
death penalty deliberations,36 which prompted Harlan to file a motion to
vacate the sentence.37 His motion alleged juror misconduct, and the trial
court granted an evidentiary hearing.38
According to facts brought forward at the hearing, the jury deliber-
ated late into Friday evening, but did not reach a verdict.39 That night,
several jurors read passages from the Bible in their hotel rooms and
searched for passages that related to the death penalty and the jury's role
in sentencing the defendant.40 One juror, Ms. Eaton-Ochoa, took notes
on two particular Bible passages.41  The first passage was Leviticus
24:20-21, "fracture for fracture, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, as he has
caused disfigurement of a man, so shall it be done to him. And whoever
kills an animal shall restore it, but whoever kills a man shall be put to
death."A2 The second passage was Romans 13:1, "let every soul be sub-
ject to the governing authorities for there is no authority except from God
and the authorities that exist are appointed by God."A3 The trial court
31. Id.





37. Seeid. at 619.
38. See id. at 620.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id. at 622.
42. Id. The court noted:
[T]hese quotations are taken from the record, in which counsel read from juror Yantis-
Cumming's Bible, a New Scofield Study Version, [which] is the Bible that Eaton-Ochoa
used on Friday night and from which she took her notes and may have been one of the
Bibles present in the jury room.




concluded that these passages and the presence of the Bible in the jury
room could have caused jury members to vote for the death penalty.44
Therefore, the trial court reversed the jury's death sentence.45
On appeal, Rule 606(b) limited the Colorado Supreme Court's in-
quiry into whether the biblical passages could have prejudiced the jury.4
Rule 606(b) precludes an inquiry into a jury verdict with the exception of
inquiries into the improper introduction of extraneous evidence.47 The
court drew from Colorado Rule 606(b) case law and compiled a list of
permissible factors to consider in such an inquiry4 8
The Colorado Supreme Court considered evidence permissible un-
der the compiled list and concluded, "[they] can no longer say that the
death penalty verdict was not influenced by passion, prejudice, or some
other arbitrary factor."49 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's order to vacate the death sentence and imposed a life sentence
without the possibility of parole.50
Justice Rice authored a dissent in which Justice Kourlis joined.5t
Justice Rice argued that the only issue was whether the presence of the
Bible caused Harlan's sentence to be prejudiced.5 2  She stressed that
there was no misconduct because the court did not instruct the jury
against bringing Bibles into the deliberation. 3 Furthermore, she argued
that defense counsel encouraged the jury to discuss the Bible because he
44. See id. at 634.
45. See id. at 623.
46. See id. at 626 ("We must ... determine whether the trial court's findings of fact are sup-
ported by evidence admissible under COLO. R. EvID. 606(b).") Rule 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as to
any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to the
effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing him to
assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental processes in
connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jurors' attention or whether any
outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit
or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter about which he would be pre-
cluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
COLO. R. EvID. 606(b)
47. See id. (discussing the exception to COLO. R. EVID. 606(b)'s prohibition against impeach-
ing a verdict with testimony from jurors).
48. See id. The court stated:
Each of these factors is appropriate for inquiry... (1) how the extraneous information re-
lates to critical issues in the case; (2) how authoritative is the source consulted; (3)
whether a juror initiated the search for the extraneous information; (4) whether the infor-
mation obtained by one juror was brought to the attention of another juror; (5) whether
the information was presented before the jury reached a unanimous verdict; and (6)




50. See id. at 633.
51. See id. at 634-39.
52. See id. at 636.
53. See id. at 635.
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asked jurors about the concept of "eye for an eye" during voir dire,54 and
discussed Harlan's habit of reading the Bible during the closing argu-
ment.55 She also argued that the court effectively instructed the jurors to
consider the Bible when it asked them to apply their "reasoned judg-
ment," and make an "individual moral assessment., 56 Furthermore she
argued, the majority was unreasonable in assuming that the Bible preju-
diced the jury and the majority opinion "exhibits a complete lack of faith
in the jury system.,57 The Colorado Supreme Court's decision is in stark
contrast to a recent decision by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in
which that court held that a Judge did not act inappropriately when she
cited the Bible as the basis for her sentencing decision.
58
B. The Sixth Circuit Court's Decision in Arnett v. Jackson
59
In Arnett, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals declined to overrule an
Ohio Supreme Court decision holding that a trial court judge's recitation
of the Bible during her sentencing decision did not violate the peti-
tioner's due process rights.60 The Sixth Circuit overruled the district
court's determination that the trial judge violated the petitioner's due
process rights when she impermissibly referenced the Bible during the
petitioner's sentencing hearing.6' The petitioner, James Arnett, entered
guilty pleas on ten counts of rape and one count of pandering obscenity
involving a minor.62 The victim of Amett's sexual abuse was the daugh-
ter of his live-in girlfriend.63 During the sentencing hearing, the Judge
referenced the Bible as an explanation for the defendant's sentence.
64
The trial judge's monologue, which served as the basis for the peti-
tioner's due process claim, reads in pertinent part:
Trial Court: And in looking at the final part of my struggle
with you, I finally answered my question late at night when I
turned to one additional source to help me. And basically,
looking at Rachel on one hand, looking at the photographs of
you happily as a child, and looking at the photographs of
downloading that came from your computer, I agree they're
very sad photographs, they're pure filth, it just tells me how ill
you are.
54. Id. at 635 n.3.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 637.
57. Id. at 638.
58. See generally Amett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681 (2004).
59. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 681.
60. See id. at 683.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 682-83.
63. Id. at 683.
64. Id at 684.
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Trial Court: And that passage where I had the opportunity to
look is Matthew 18:5, 6. 'And whoso shall receive one such
little child in my name, receiveth me. But, whoso shall offend
one of these little ones which believe in me, it were better for
him that a millstone were hanged about his neck, and he were
drowned in the depth of the sea.'
65
Arnett appealed the trial court's decision and the Ohio Court of Ap-
peals vacated the sentence, "concluding that his due process rights were
violated by virtue of the trial court 'factoring in religion' when imposing
its sentence. 66 The Ohio Supreme Court unanimously concluded, "the
judge's Biblical reference did not violate Arnett's right to due process
because it was not the 'basis' of the sentencing determination, but rather
'one of several reasons' or an 'additional source' relied upon by the trial
court. 6 7 Arnett filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in district court
alleging that the Ohio Supreme Court incorrectly applied Supreme Court
precedent on the issue of whether the court can rely on religious passages
in a sentencing decision.68 A ett's habeas petition also alleged that the
trial court violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment;
however, the United States magistrate judge held that the Establishment
Clause claim was procedurally invalid because the defendant raised it for
the first time in the Ohio Supreme Court. 69 The magistrate judge found
that the trial court's reliance on the Bible as a "final source of authority"
constituted an impermissible factor for sentencing, and granted Arnett's
70habeas petition on the finding of a denial of due process.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit recognized that although the United
States Supreme Court has held that a fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process,7' the Court has not decided the narrow issue
of whether citing a religious text during a sentencing hearing violates a
defendant's due process rights.72 The Court of Appeals held that the
magistrate judge should not have granted the petition because the Su-
preme Court had not decided the exact issue at hand.73 Furthermore, the
Sixth Circuit held that the trial judge's reliance on the Bible was proper
because "the principle embedded in the referenced Biblical passage (of
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. (quoting State v. Amett, 724 N.E.2d 793, 803 (Ohio 2000)).
68. Id. at 684-85.
69. See id. at 685 n.2.
70. Id.
71. See In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
72. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 686 ("[T]he Supreme Court has never specifically decided whether
a defendant's right to due process is violated if a religious text or commentary is cited during a
sentencing hearing and/or considered by a trial court in reaching a sentencing determination.").
73. See id. at 686.
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not harming young children) is fully consistent with Ohio's sentencing
consideration to the same effect."
74
The dissent argued that the Bible played a significant role in Ar-
nett's sentence. 75 The dissent agreed with the district court's determina-
tion that the trial judge looked to the Bible as her "final source of author-
ity, '76 but it reasoned that the trial judge would not have employed the
Bible to answer her dilemma unless it "carries special significance as a
source of moral authority. 77 The dissent believed the trial judge ac-
corded the biblical passages read at Arnett's sentencing hearing "consti-
tutionally significant weight. 78  Therefore, the trial judge violated
Arnett's rights to due process. 79 The dissent stated that the trial judge's
motivation was identical to that of the sentencing judge in United States
v. Bakker.80 In that case, the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant's sen-
tence because the sentencing judge's "personal religious principles" were
the basis for the sentencing decision.
81
C. The Fourth Circuit Court's Decision in United States. v. Bakker
82
In United States v. Bakker, James 0. Bakker, a well-known televan-
gelist, appealed his fraud and conspiracy convictions to the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.83 Bakker challenged his sentence by claiming that
the trial judge's "personal religious beliefs" impermissibly affected the
84sentence. During sentencing, the trial judge stated that Bakker "had no
thought whatever about his victims and those of us who do have a relig-
ion are ridiculed as being saps from money-grubbing preachers or
priests. 85  Bakker argued that the judge's comments constituted an
abuse of discretion and a violation of Bakker's due process rights be-
86cause the judge factored personal religious beliefs into the sentence.
The government argued that the judge was not speaking for himself but
for society as a whole and was well within his discretion.87
74. Id. at 686-87. The "Ohio Sentencing considerations" referred to by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals are enumerated in the OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(b)(1) (2005). Inter alia, the
Code requires the sentencing judge to consider whether: "(1) The physical or mental injury suffered
by the victim of the offense due to the conduct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physi-
cal or mental condition or age of the victim;" and whether "(6) The offender's relationship with the
victim facilitated the offense." Id.
75. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 689 (Clay, J., dissenting).
76. Id. at 690.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 692.
79. Id. at 692.
80. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
81. Bakker, 925 F.2d at 741.
82. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991).
83. Id. at 731.
84. Id.





The Circuit Court recognized that it was appropriate for a sentenc-
ing court to consider the social impact of the crimes the defendant alleg-
edly committed and the opportunity to vindicate those crimes for the
community. 88 And, "to a considerable extent a sentencing judge is the
embodiment of public condemnation and social outrage. 89 In dicta, the
court recognized that while the Constitution does not require a person to
surrender her religious beliefs if they are appointed to judicial office,
"[c]ourts ... cannot sanction sentencing procedures that create the per-
ception of the bench as a pulpit from which judges announce their per-
sonal sense of religiosity and simultaneously punish defendants for of-
fending it."90 The court held that the trial judge's comments had ex-
ceeded his discretion and the court vacated Bakker's sentence and re-
manded his case for re-sentencing.9'
II. ANALYSIS
In People v. Harlan,92 the Colorado Supreme Court concluded that
the Bible might have prejudiced the death sentence the jury handed
down. 93 In doing so, the court avoided following the dubious "vaguely
in-line" standard espoused in Arnett v. Jackson9 4 and argued for in Jus-
tice Rice's dissent.95 The standards utilized in Arnett and United States
v. Bakker96 reveal standards courts have applied to sentences allegedly
tainted by religious influence. Furthermore, the circuit court cases reveal
the standards the Colorado Supreme Court may apply if it were review-
ing a sentence decided by a judge. The Harlan decision correctly as-
serted that the Bible has a prejudicial effect on jurors because of the pro-
found role religion plays in the average American life.97 The majority's
narrow holding took a big step towards limiting religious influence in
jury deliberations. However, in reality it only prohibits the presence of
the Bible in the jury deliberation room.98
A. A Questionable Standard
The Sixth Circuit majority opinion in Arnett attempted to establish
the following standard: courts will tolerate biblical passages if they are
"vaguely in-line" with state law.99 Justice Rice employed the same logic
88. Id. (citing United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 246-47 (2d Cir. 1990)).
89. Id. (citing United States v. Madison, 689 F.2d 1300, 1314-15 (7th Cir. 1982)).
90. id.
91. Id. at 741.
92. 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2005).
93. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 634.
94. 393 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2005).
95. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 634-39.
96. 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cit. 1991).
97. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 633.
98. See id.
99. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 686-87. The majority agues that the biblical quote cited by the
judge was "fully consistent with Ohio's sentencing consideration," codified at OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2929.12(b)(1) (West 2005). Id. at 687.
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in the Harlan dissent.'00 She argued the reading and discussion by the
jury of Romans 13:1, "[e]veryone must submit himself to the governing
authorities, for there is no authority except that which God has estab-
lished," could not have been prejudicial to the jury because the passage
merely "instructs individuals to follow the laws of Colorado."10 1 The
majority opinion in Harlan found Justice Rice's arguments unpersua-
sive 102 and correctly chose not to follow the Sixth Circuit's standard be-
cause it would force judges to take part in biblical interpretation.
The "standard" suggests that judges may allow the incorporation of
biblical passages in sentencing decisions if they can find an interpretation
of the biblical passage that resembles state law. For example, the Sixth
Circuit found that Matthew 18:5, which calls for the punishment of child
molesters by hanging a millstone around their necks and having them
thrown in the sea, 10 3 "wholly consistent" with Ohio sentencing guide-
lines.'°4 Ohio law instructs the sentencing court to consider "[t]he physi-
cal or mental injury suffered by the victim of the offense due to the con-
duct of the offender was exacerbated because of the physical or mental
condition or age of the victim. '' 1°5 Matthew 18:5 is only consistent with
Ohio law in that it considers abuse to young children, and is even vague
on that point. Does "offending," mean molesting? Does it mean raping?
Alternatively, does it simply mean being rude to? Matthew 18:5 suggests
that someone who commits the sexual assault of a child should be put to
death by drowning. 1°6 The Ohio sentencing statue does not permit the
court to consider capital punishment, and more importantly the Eight
Amendment and the Supreme Court case law interpreting the amendment
clearly state that the death penalty is inappropriate for any crime less
than murder. 10 7 The biblical quote cited by the trial judge in Arnett was
not consistent with state law and had no place in the trial judge's deci-
sion. The jury's discussion of Romans 13:1 in Harlan is unacceptable
for the same reason: because our laws do not require a submission to
authority, and our authority does not require the death penalty.
10 8
Justice Rice argued that Romans 13:1 should be tolerated because
"the well-accepted interpretation of [the] passage is that individuals are
100. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 637 (Rice, J., dissenting).
101. Id.
102. See generally id. at 618-34 (explanatory parenthentical needed - so might be able to
reduce the pinpoint cite once he writes this).
103. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 684 (quoting Matthew 18:5, 6).
104. See id.
105. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.12(B)(1) (West 2002).
106. Mathew 18:5 (King James).
107. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."); see also Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977) (holding that the death penalty was a grossly disproportionate punishment for the crime of
rape of an adult woman).
108. See Romans 13:1 (King James).
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to obey the laws of their nation."'0 9 Justice Rice reasoned that the bibli-
cal passage was not prejudicial because its effect would only lead a juror
to follow the laws of Colorado, which require a four-step process to sen-
tence a defendant to death." 0 The principles behind the Constitution are
not in line with Justice Rice's interpretation of Romans 13:1. The First
Amendment encourages people to question government officials, protest
against inequality and impeach politicians if need be."1 Furthermore,
Justice Rice's argument in favor of Romans 13:1 was flawed because the
biblical passage, like most biblical passages, is esoteric. Romans 13:1
does much more than just encourage jurors to follow the law; it suggests
that jurors have a divine obligation to apply the laws of state, and an ob-
ligation to vote in favor of the death penalty.
Justice Rice's dissent also revealed another reason why the
"vaguely in-line standard" is dangerous to our court system. Her dissent
serves as an example of how judges would participate in biblical inter-
pretation.1 12 Judge Clay's dissent in Arnett warned that "[u]nder this
approach, the judgments of trial courts could begin to resemble the fat-
was of religious clerics, and the opinions of appellate courts echo the
proclamations of the Sanhedrin."' 
13
Justice Rice began her discussion of Romans 13:1 by stating: "the
plain meaning and well-accepted interpretation of this passage is that...
,, 4 Indeed Justice Rice is interpreting the Bible. She chose to employ a
majority interpretation of the Bible, which presumes there are minority
interpretations that she chose not to follow. She also states that her un-
derstanding of the passage was the "plain meaning" of the passage. This
suggests that she applied the canons of construction common to statutory
or contract interpretation to discern the intent of the author. 1 5 Religion
does not have the force of law and judges do not have a duty to interpret
it. Courts should abandon the standard established by the Sixth Circuit
in Arnett and followed in Justice Rice's dissent in Harlan. The Colorado
Supreme Court correctly decided against employing the "vaguely in-
line" standard in its decision.
B. A Different Standard
In Bakker, the Fourth Circuit did not employ the "vaguely in-line
standard" espoused by the Sixth Circuit." 6 Instead, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the defendant's sentence because the trial court believed the trial
109. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 637.
110. See id. at 630.
111. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
112. See Arnett, 393 F.3d at 691.
113. Id.
114. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 637.
115. See, e.g., Richard A. Lord, Rules of Interpretation, in § 32:3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
(4th ed. 2005) ("The plain meaning of language will be given to the words of a contract.").
116. See Bakker, 925 F.2d at 741.
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judge's "personal religious principles" played a decisive role in the
court's sentencing determination." 7 The Fourth Circuit's approach is
preferable to the "vaguely in-line" standard because it objectively con-
siders whether religion has prejudiced a sentence.' 8 The Colorado Su-
preme Court would likely have applied the Bakker standard if a judge
had decided Harlan's sentence. Other reviewing courts should utilize
the Bakker standard when a judge's "personal religious principles" taint
their sentencing decisions." 9
The Fourth Circuit based its decision on the following statement by
the trial judge, "those of us that do have a religion are ridiculed as being
saps."'12 The Sixth Circuit distinguished Bakker from Arnett, and incor-
rectly applied the "personal religiosity" standard by arguing that the trial
judge in Arnett "made no reference whatsoever to her own religious be-
liefs in sentencing Arnett."' 2' The Sixth Circuit made this claim despite
the trial judge's statement that she had been struggling to find an answer
and found that answer in the Bible. 22 Why would the trial judge look for
an answer in the Bible unless the Bible was an integral part of her "per-
sonal religious principles?" By using a quote from the Bible to make a
decision on the length of a defendant's sentence, the trial judge's per-
sonal religiosity became a factor in the sentence.
Although Bakker and Arnett read together do not form a single-
workable standard, one thing is evident: courts may be more willing to
vacate a sentence if a trial judge explicitly references her religiosity dur-
ing the sentencing hearing. If the Colorado Supreme Court chooses to
review a judge-made sentence allegedly prejudiced by religion, the jus-
tices likely would consider whether the judge's personal religiosity
played a role in the sentence, and whether the judge's comments express
that prejudice.
The court in Harlan could not use the standard set forth in Bakker
because Rule 606(b) restricts courts from considering whether the Bible
and the biblical quotes discussed actually swayed the jury's decision.
123
Instead, the court could only inquire into "whether there is a reasonable
possibility that ... extraneous information influence[d] the verdict to the
detriment of the defendant ....
117. See id.
118. See id. at 740.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Arnett, 393 F.3d at 687.
122. See id. at 683.
123. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 625 ("The court may not take into account testimony regarding
the jury's deliberations, a juror's mental processes leading to his or her decision, or whether the
extraneous information actually swayed any of the particular jurors' votes."); see also discussion
infra Part II.
124. Harlan, 109 P.3dat 625 (citing Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139, 1142 (Colo. 1987)).
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C. Was There a Reasonable Possibility That the Jury Was Prejudiced?
Justice Rice's dissent stated, "there is no reasonable possibility that
a typical jury would be prejudiced by exposure to the biblical passages at
issue here."'' 25 The majority disputed this conclusion and stated, "there is
a reasonable possibility that the extraneous biblical texts influenced the
verdict to Harlan's detriment."'' 26 The majority reasoned that Americans
live "[in] a community where Holy Scripture has factual and legal import
for many citizens."1 27 The majority's decision rested on an unconfirmed
premise. It is only reasonable to assume that the Bible could have preju-
diced Harlan's sentence if the United States is a highly religious society.
Furthermore, the premise is correct only if the members of our highly
religious society, the jurors, believe the Bible to be the Word of God.
According to a recent Gallup poll roughly six in ten American
adults say that religion is "very important" in their lives, 2 8 twenty-eight
percent of adults nationwide go to church at least once a week,129 and
ninety percent of adults nationwide believe in God while only four per-
cent do not.130 The same poll, reported in May 2004, observed that fifty
percent of adults nationwide are Protestant, twenty-three percent of
adults nationwide are Catholic, and nine percent of adults nationwide say
they are Christian but have no specific church.13  When asked specifi-
cally about the Bible, forty-two percent of adults nationwide said that
they believe "[t]he Bible is the actual Word of God,', 132 and thirty-seven
percent of adults nationwide believe that "[t]he Bible is the Word of God
but not everything in it should be taken literally."'' 33  Although only
forty-two percent of adults nationwide say they believe the Bible is the
Word of God, sixty percent believe "[t]he story of Noah and the ark in
which it rained for 40 days and nights, the entire world was flooded, and
only Noah, his family and the animals on their ark survived," is literally
true. 134 Moreover, sixty-one percent of Americans believe "[t]he crea-
tion story in which the world was created in six days," is literally true,
and sixty-four percent of Americans believe "[t]he story about Moses
125. Id. at 633.
126. Id. at 637.
127. Id at 633.
128. Dr. Richard Land, How religion defines America, BBC News, UK Edition (Feb. 25,
2004), http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/programmes/wtwtgod/3518221.stm. The BBC article contrasts the
importance of religion in the United States to that of Canada and the United Kingdom where only 28
percent and 17 percent of those polled described religion as "very important" in their lives. Id.
129. The Gallup Poll, May 2-4, 2004, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Virginia Commonwealth University Life Sciences Survey, Sept. 3-26, 2003,
http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm.
133. Id.
134. ABC News PrimeTime Poll, Feb. 6-10, 2004, http://www.pollingreport.com/religion.htm.
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parting the Red Sea so the Jews could escape from Egypt" is also liter-
ally true. 
135
Furthermore, Cornell University Law Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson
agrees with the Colorado Supreme Court's ruling, specifically that it
recognizes the effect of the Bible in a religiously based society. She
stated, "[t]he majority is correct in saying that in a heavily religious cul-
ture, to recite the Bible to someone could have a prejudicial effect on the
sentencing."'' 36  The above poll numbers support Professor Johnson's
statement. If ninety percent of Americans believe in God, twenty-eight
percent of Americans attend church once a week, and roughly six in ten
American adults say that religion is "very important in their lives," it is
fair for Professor Johnson and the Colorado Supreme Court to character-
ize the United States culture as "heavily religious."
Furthermore, the poll numbers also support Professor Johnson's as-
sertion, and the court's holding, that the Bible "could have [had] a preju-
dicial effect on the sentencing."' 37 In the court's opinion, "The written
word persuasively conveys the authentic ring of reliable authority .. .
,,138 The court further notes, "Some jurors may view biblical texts like
the Leviticus passage at issue here as a factual representation of God's
will.' 39 The poll cited above states that forty-two percent of adults na-
tionwide believe the Bible is the actual word of God.140 Mathematically,
out of a jury of twelve citizens it is fair to assume that five believe the
Bible is the Word of God. It is also fair to assume that if an individual
believes the Bible is the Word of God that they believe people should
obey the Bible as well as passages directing capital punishment for the
crime of murder.
Moreover, the poll numbers say that sixty percent of Americans be-
lieve the story of Noah's Ark.141 Noah's Ark is a particularly interesting
Bible story because of what some might consider its impossible qualities
- a story in which a flood extinguished all life, and the world was re-
populated only with the pairs of animals on Noah's Ark. Widely ac-
cepted scientific truths refute the biblical account. Nonetheless, a sig-
nificant majority of Americans believe the story to be true - literally
true. 142 While it is only fair to assume - based on the polling numbers -
that five of twelve jurors believe the Bible is the Word of God, it is fair
to say that seven of those jurors believe the story of Noah's Ark. If the
135. Id.
136. David L. Hudson Jr., Making Biblical References at Trial May Be Grounds for Reversal,
A.B.A. J., July 2005 at 14, 14 (quoting Prof. Johnson).
137. Id.
138. Harlan, 109 P.3d, at 632.
139. Id.
140. Virginia Commonwealth University Life Sciences Survey, supra note 132.
141. ABC News Prime Time Poll, supra note 134.
142. ABC News Prime Time Poll, supra note 134.
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American population is willing to believe, what some might consider, an
impossible story such as Noah's Ark, it follows that they would be even
more willing to believe biblical passages such as "eye for an eye, life for
a life.', 143 The story of Noah's Ark might seem far-fetched to some, but
"eye for an eye" seems logical and requires a less significant suspension
of the average American's disbelief. The above statistics reveal the pro-
pensity of biblical passages to prejudice an average juror.
The Bible can also have a profound effect on jurors who are not
highly religious or non-religious. There is no doubt that the Bible plays
an important role in civil ceremonies. For example, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court swears the President of the United States into office
with his hand over the Bible; and, witnesses offering testimony in court
have traditionally sworn to tell the truth on the Bible. Interestingly, Pro-
fessor Kevin O'Neil suggests that the Bible is just as prejudicial as any
other learned text and courts should keep it out of the jury deliberation
room for the same reason.144 The hearsay exception for learned treatises
allows "[a]n expert witness [to] refer to a passage in a treatise, but that
treatise is not allowed inside the jury room for fear that jurors will roam
at large through its pages, drawing unguided and possibly erroneous con-
clusions."' 145  Professor O'Neil suggests that allowing the Bible in the
jury deliberation room could cause a similar problem.146 Jurors might
roam through the Bible, find, and apply standards different from those
given in the jury instructions.
147
D. Harlan's Narrow Holding
The Harlan majority held that the jury did not follow the instruc-
tions given to them before the deliberation.
148 Justice Rice disagreed. 149
She argued that the court's instructions actually "directed the jurors to
consider their moral and religious precepts, as well as their general
knowledge, when making a reasoned judgment about whether or not to
impose the death penalty."'150 She argued that the following jury instruc-
tions called for the jury to consider biblical quotations: "[y]ou must still
all make a further individual moral assessment of whether you've been
convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the death penalty instead of
life in prison is the appropriate punishment; "' and "[t]his consideration
143. See supra note 42.
144. See Hudson, supra note 136, at 14.
145. Id. (quoting Prof. O'Neil).
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 629 ("Because the trial court's admonitions were thorough and
sufficient to instruct a capital sentencing jury, and because the written biblical materials used in the
jury room were neither admitted into evidence nor permitted by court instruction, their use in this
case was improper.").
149. See id. at 634-39 (Rice, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 637.
151. Id. at 622 (emphasis added).
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involves a process in which you must apply your reasoned judgment in
deciding whether the situation calls for life imprisonment or the imposi-
tion of the death penalty."'
52
Justice Rice argued that these instructions called for the jury to con-
sider their moral and religious precepts, which for many who believe that
the Bible is the Word of God, calls for the consideration of biblical pas-
sages. 53  The majority essentially agreed with Justice Rice, stating,
"[w]e do not hold that an individual juror may not rely on and discuss
with the other jurors during deliberation his or her religious upbringing,
education, and beliefs in making the extremely difficult 'reasoned judg-
ment' and 'moral decision."",154 The majority opinion recognized that the
jury instructions given might encourage jurors to consider and discuss
their own religious thoughts during jury deliberation.155  The majority
opinion only held that it was "improper for a juror to bring the Bible into
the jury room,"'' 56 and that the actual physical presence of the Bible has a
powerful prejudicial effect on jurors. 1
57
The majority's narrow holding indicates that the court was looking
to draw a line. It was trying to determine how much to tolerate in a death
sentence deliberation. The court was torn between the competing inter-
ests of providing a fair trial for Harlan and respecting the backgrounds
and beliefs of the jury.158 The Colorado Supreme Court essentially held
that it would tolerate any presence of religion in the jury deliberation
room except for the presence of a Bible. 159 The court may have desired
to draw the line even further towards restricting religious influence;
however, it was bound by Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b).
III. COLORADO RULE OF EVIDENCE 606(B)
16 1
Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) is identical to the Federal Rule of
Evidence 606(b), which "incorporates the long-established policy of pro-
tecting the secrecy of jury deliberations. ' 61 The purpose of Rule 606(b)
is to "encourag[e] the finality of jury verdicts," to "conserve[e] judicial
resources by foreclosing lengthy adversary hearings on marginal claims
of misconduct," and to "preserv[e] the dignity of the court."'162 Further-
more, the protections of 606(b) encourage open discussion in the jury
152. Id. (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 637 (Rice, J., dissenting).






160. See supra note 46 for text of COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
161. Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is
the Broad Exclusionary Principal ofRule 606(b) Justified? 66 N.C. L. REv. 509, 509 (1988).




room, reduce juror harassment by those angry about the verdict, and
"prevent[] minority jurors from agreeing to the verdict only to challenge
it at a later time."'163 The operation of 606(b) raises a conflict "between
the need for confidentiality of deliberation and verdict finality, and the
requirement that the case be decided solely on the evidence presented to
a fair and impartial jury."'164 The Colorado Supreme Court properly ap-
plied Rule 606(b) in People v. Harlan165 according to its precedent; how-
ever, the threat of extraneous information prejudicing jury decisions re-
mains. The Colorado Supreme Court should consider the arguments
made by proponents of amending Rule 606(b) 166 and should amend the
rule to allow the observation of jury conduct and to ensure defendants
receive sentences free from religious prejudice.
A. The Colorado Precedent: Wiser v. People'
67 and People v. Wadle' 68
Two Colorado cases have formed the standard by which Colorado
courts determine whether jury misconduct has tainted a verdict. Wiser
and Wadle established a two-part inquiry: "first, a court makes a deter-
mination that extraneous information was improperly before the jury;
and second, based on an objective 'typical juror' standard, makes a de-
termination whether use of that extraneous information posed the reason-
able possibility of prejudice to the defendant."' 69 In Harlan, the court
found that the facts met the two-part test and impeached the verdict.
7 °
In Wiser, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that it was improper
for a juror to consider a dictionary definition of the word "burglary," the
crime with which the defendant was charged. 17' The court cited other
cases in which juries had consulted dictionaries and held that "[j]urors
are required to follow only the law as it is given in the court's instruc-
tions; they are bound, therefore, to accept the court's definitions of legal
concepts .. ,,172
163. See Crump, supra note 161, at 512.
164. James W. Diehm, Impeachment of Jury Verdicts: Tanner v. United States and Beyond, 65
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 389, 394 (1991).
165. 109 P.3d 616, 633 (Colo. 2005).
166. See, e.g., Gregory M. Ashley, Theology in the Jury Room: Religious Discussion as "Ex-
traneous Material" in the Course of Capital Punishment Deliberations, 55 VAND. L. REV. 127
(2002) (arguing that both federal and state courts should amend their interpretations of Rule 606(b)
to address the effect of religious discussion in capital punishment deliberations); Comments of Fed-
eral Magistrate Judges Association Rules Committee on Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and Evidence, 2005 FED. CTS. L. REv. 2 (proposing amend-
ment to 606(b) that would clarify whether juror statement can be admitted to prove a disparity be-
tween the verdict intended and the final verdict).
167. 732 P.2d 1139 (Colo. 1987).
168. 97 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2004).
169, Harlan, 109 P.3d at 624.
170. Id. at 629-31.
171. Wiser, 732 P.2dat 1141.
172. Id. (citing Alvarez v. People, 653 P.2d 1127 (Colo. 1982)).
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In Wadle, the court affirmed the Colorado Court of Appeals finding
that information retrieved from the Internet and subsequently shared with
the jury was "improper" and "extraneous."' 173 The jury had previously
sent a note to the trial judge requesting a copy of the Physician's Desk
Reference, looking for information on the anti-depressant drug Paxil.
174
The court informed the jury that "supplying reference materials of any
kind to a jury was prohibited, and it referred the jury back to its instruc-
tions." 175 Although the court had admonished the jury against the con-
sideration of extraneous information, it extended its ruling by holding
that extraneous information is improper "whether or not ... [it was] the
result of deliberate juror misconduct.',
176
In Harlan, the majority stated, "our cases are clear that extraneous
information is improper for juror consideration whether or not the court
specifically warned against its use."'17 7 The court noted that this rule
applies whether the improper evidence is factual as in Wadle, or if the
evidence is legal as in Wiser.178 Therefore, the presence, and the subse-
quent discussion, of the Bible in the jury deliberation room in Harlan
were clearly "extraneous." The Bible provides alternative opinions about
when to inflict the death penalty - just as the dictionary offered an alter-
native definition for "burglary" in Wiser. And, although the court did not
expressly forbid the presence of the Bible, as the court held in Wadle, the
court can find information "extraneous" whether the court forbids it or
not. 179
The Colorado Supreme Court combined factors considered in Wiser
and Wadle and compiled a list to determine whether improper introduc-
tion of the extraneous information created a reasonable possibility that
the jury's verdict was influenced to the detriment of the defendant.'
80
The factors are: (1) how the extraneous information relates to critical
issues in the case; (2) how authoritative is the source consulted; (3)
whether a juror initiated the search for the extraneous information; (4)
whether the information obtained by one juror was brought to the atten-
tion of another juror; (5) whether the information was presented before
the jury reached a unanimous verdict; and (6) whether the information
would be likely to influence a typical juror to the detriment of the defen-
dant.'
8 '
173. Wadle, 97 P.3d at 933.
174. See id. at 934.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 935.
177. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 625.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 626. The court disclaims that this is.not a formal test or an exhaustive list, but are
"useful" and "persuasive." Id.
181. Id. (citing Wadle, 97 P.3d at 935; Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1142).
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The court applied the facts of the jury's deliberation to the factors
above and reasoned "we do not have confidence that the death penalty
here was not influenced by extraneous information.' ' 82 Justice Rice's
dissent attacked the majority's list of factors appropriate for inquiry un-
der 606(b) and exhorted, "neither Wiser nor Wadle support this kind of
categorical approach when undertaking an analysis of extraneous infor-
mation."' 83 She argued that, "the sole inquiry upon which each case fo-
cuses is whether there is a reasonable possibility that exposure to extra-
neous information prejudiced the jury."' 84 Justice Rice's argument was
without substance because the majority's list of factors was simply a
break down of her "sole inquiry." Justice Rice was simply arguing for a
less probative investigation into the conduct of the jury. The majority's
list of factors provides courts with a useful outline to focus their "extra-
neous information" inquiry.
B. The Loophole in 606(b)
The Colorado Supreme Court's holding in Harlan prohibits the
presence of the Bible in jury deliberations, 185 but it does not prohibit the
discussion of religion during deliberations. 186 The court actually expects
that jurors will discuss religion.' 87 The court's justification for prohibit-
ing the actual text of the Bible and not other manifestations of religion,
such as recitation of biblical passages, was that "the written word persua-
sively conveys the authentic ring of reliable authority in a way the recol-
lected spoken word does not."'
' 88
The court's distinction is imperfect. Charismatic reverends, or even
a well-schooled churchgoer could be as prejudicial as a Bible, and possi-
bly even more so. A religious orator would be able to recite passages
from memory, and his or her interpretations would carry with it the au-
thority of a "Man of God." Moreover, some believe group prayer during
jury deliberations is common, 189 and since no one but the jurors ever
learns that group prayer has occurred, it is fair to assume that "the in-
stances that find their way into judicial opinions represent only the tip of
the iceberg."' 190 The power of prayer could be just as, or more, prejudi-
cial than the physical presence of a Bible; however, Rule 606(b) forbids
courts from impeaching the Bible recitation and group prayer.' 91 The
rule precludes jurors from testifying as to any occurrences in the jury
182. Id.at 634.
183. Id. at 636 n.8.
184. Id. (citing Wadle, 97 P.3d at 935; Wiser, 732 P.2d at 1142).
185. Id. at 632.
186. Id.
187. Id. ("We expect jurors to bring their backgrounds and beliefs to bear on their deliberations
but to give ultimate consideration only to the facts admitted and the law as instructed.").
188. Id.
189. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1125.
190. Id.
191. COLO. R. EVID. 606(b).
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room, or to anything that affected the jurors mind during deliberation. 92
While the policy considerations behind Rule 606(b) are important, open-
ing jury deliberations up to further scrutiny may be the only way to en-
sure defendants receive sentences free from prejudice.
The Colorado Supreme Court has left a loophole in which religion
can still prejudice juries. Even if the ruling in Harlan prohibits Bibles in
the future, religion can still prejudice juries in the form of Bible recita-
tion from memory, group prayer and pre-prepared notes. Justice would
best be served if the court could guarantee that every sentence decided by
a jury is free from prejudice.
The court could regulate this conduct if the court recorded and re-
viewed jury deliberations. Opponents of this practice may claim that
recording jury deliberation compromises the policy goals of Rule 606(b).
The authors of Rule 606(b) designed the rule to encourage the finality of
jury verdicts 193 and reviewing recorded jury deliberations would under-
mine this goal. Furthermore, the authors designed the rule to "conserve
judicial resources by foreclosing lengthy adversary hearings on marginal
claims of misconduct," to "preserve the dignity of the court," to encour-
age "free and frank discussions inside the jury room," to reduce juror
harassment, and to "prevent minority jurors from agreeing to the verdict
only to challenge it at a later time"'194 Concern over the effect recordings
may have on the efficacy of the jury is valid; however, the court could
take steps to mitigate the negative effects.
The court could withhold the recordings from the public so that
those angry about the jury decision could not single out jurors for ridi-
cule. Judges could simply call a mistrial if they found prejudicial infor-
mation, which would forego lengthy hearings. Jurors would receive a
warning in their instructions that the court will record their deliberation,
only the judge will view the recording, and that they are encouraged to
have a free and frank discussion. Ultimately, the policy considerations
behind Rule 606(b) are less important than the need for a jury sentence
free from prejudice - especially a death sentence. The court should re-
view jury conduct consistently and objectively to ensure that we are not
executing people because a jury was swayed by a Bible passage or a
prayer session.
Recording deliberations raises many difficult issues. Courts and
judges may not have the time or resources to review all jury deliberation
recordings, but it is not necessary to review all jury deliberations. The
court need only review the deliberations where there is a suspicion of
192. Id.
193. Crump, supra note 161, at 512.
194. Id. (describing the policy considerations underlying Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b),
which is the federal equivalent of Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b)); Harlan, 109 P.3d at 624
(citing Stewart v. Rice, 47 P.3d 316, 322 (Colo. 2002)).
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misconduct. Finally, legislatures and courts might find recordings too
intrusive in every case, but they should at least record death penalty de-
liberations. Death penalty jury deliberations are unique. The result of
jury misconduct is irreversible once the sentence is carried out. Death
penalty juries should be held to a higher standard by recording their de-
liberations to ensure they sentence the defendant free from prejudice.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide, "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.'' 95 The Supreme Court has applied the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment to prohibit prayer in public
school, 196 to prohibit the decoration of public buildings with religious
symbols, 197 and to limit the delegation of governmental authority to reli-
gious organizations.198 The Court should also apply the First Amend-
ment to limit the influence of religion in the courtroom and the jury de-
liberation room. Religion plays a "prominent role"1 99 in capital cases
during peremptory challenges, closing arguments and jury delibera-
tions.2°° Despite its frequent presence, questions as to its propriety "have
almost always been framed and answered with little or no attention to"
the First Amendment. 20' Harlan was no exception; he did not allege an
Establishment Clause violation. 202 Interestingly, Arnett did claim an
Establishment Clause violation; 20 3 however, the trial court denied it for
procedural reasons.2 °4 The court did not deny Arnett's claim for substan-
tive reasons. This suggests that attorneys are considering the effective-
ness of Establishment Clause claims in cases where religion has influ-
enced a sentence. The defense could have attacked Harlan's sentence on
Establishment Clause grounds and this Part predicts the outcome of a
hypothetical Establishment Clause claim, if Harlan's counsel had raised
the issue.205
First, Harlan must successfully argue that the act of sentencing a de-
fendant is state action.2 °6 On one hand, it can be argued that jurors are
195. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
196. See generally Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding school led
prayer at football game unconstitutional on Establishment Clause grounds).
197. See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (holding that while
Creche violated Establishment Clause, menorah next to Christmas tree did not).
198. See generally Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(invalidating a separate school district created for a religious group).
199. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1092.
200. See id.
201. Id.
202. See generally People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
203. See infra Part I.B.
204. See Arnett v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 681, 685 (2004).
205. 109 P.3d 616 (Colo. 2000).
206. See Terrence T. Egland, Prejudiced by the Presence of God: Keeping Religious Material
Out of Death Penalty Deliberations, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 337, 358 (2004).
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not state actors because they are private citizens and the state has no con-
trol over their decisions.2 °7 On the other, "they should be seen as state
actors when serving as jurors because they are acting pursuant to a dele-
gation of authority from the state. 20 8 The state pays jurors for their time
and the Supreme Court has referred to them as "a government body.' '2°9
Some argue that, "it is only a natural extension of current law governing
the actions of court actors to find the jury to be similarly bound as judges
and prosecutors., 210 If the court were to decide jurors are state actors,
the court system might face serious and unperceived ramifications. An
immeasurable variety of private actions "might be constrained and chal-
lenged.",211 We must deal with the ramifications. Otherwise, we allow
the hollow fiction, that jurors are acting independently of the state, to
dilute our justice system. The state summons jurors, subjects them to
penalties, instructs them, and has them serve a function of the State.
They are state actors and must follow the rules applied to the state.
If Harlan successfully argued that jurors were state actors, the next
step would have been to argue that the presence of the Bible in the jury
deliberations failed the three-pronged Lemon v. Kurtzman test. 2 12 Under
the Lemon test, religious texts used in jury deliberations will be found
unconstitutional if the texts' presence: (1) has no secular purpose; (2) has
a principal primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion; or (3)
fosters an excessive government entanglement with religion. 213  While
the Lemon test has come under attack by members of the Court,2 14 and its
future role is "uncertain, '' 15 it is still followed by lower courts. 216 The
more recent Establishment Clause precedent only finds a violation of the
Establishment Clause if "the government establishes a church, coerces
religious participation, or favors some religions over others. 217
The jury's conduct in Harlan would fail all three prongs of the
Lemon test. First, the presence of the Bible during jury deliberation has
no secular purpose. The Bible's presence and the discussion of biblical
passages only tainted the secular procedure with religious standards and
prejudices. The presence of the Bible also would violate the second
prong, also known as the "effect" prong. If the Colorado Supreme Court
207. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1108.
208. Id.
209. See id. (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 626 (1991)).
210. Egland, supra note 206, at 144 ("Jurors are protected by common law immunity from
prosecution, just as judges and prosecutors are, and should be held to the same standard.").
211. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 513 (2002).
212. See id at 1158 (discussing the holding of the court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971)).
213. Id. at 1159.




217. Id. at 1154 (discussing the holding in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000)).
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allowed jurors to bring Bibles into the jury deliberation room, and to
discuss the Bible during the deliberation, it would effectively promote
religion over non-religion and Christianity over religions that do not con-
sider the Bible holy. It would send a signal to jurors and the public that
religion has a place in the criminal justice system. The United States
Supreme Court has noted that the Establishment Clause "precludes [the]
government from conveying or attempting to convey a message that re-
ligion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred."'2 18 If the
Colorado Supreme Court had ruled that the discussion of Leviticus
24:20-21 and Romans 13:1 was permissible during Harlan's death pen-
alty jury deliberations, it would have conveyed a message that those par-
ticular religious principles are preferred. Finally, the presence of the
Bible during Harlan's sentencing deliberation would have impermissibly
entangled the government with religion. Allowing jurors to bring Bibles
into jury deliberations would have set a precedent that our civil justice
system sentences defendants subject to the religious views of jurors.
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in flux, and many Supreme
Court Justices prefer other tests.219 The "endorsement" test, formulated
by Justice O'Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,220 asks whether the govern-
ment action "endorses" religion.221 Under the more recent and less strict
Mitchell v. Helms222 test, an Establishment Clause violation is found if
the presence or function of religion amounts to "coercion." 223 The Court
ruled that prayers during football games were impermissibly coercive in
Sante Fe Independent School District v. Doe.224 Justice Stevens argued
that the practice "threatens the imposition of coercion upon those stu-
dents not desiring to participate in a religious exercise. 225 Courts should
apply the same standard in cases such as Harlan where jurors bring reli-
gious texts into jury deliberations. The presence of the Bible may coerce
Jurors into believing that they are obligated to vote a certain way. The
effect is possibly even more coercive than in Santa Fe Independent
School District, where the court recognized that students could feel co-
erced by mass prayer.226 In that scenario, at least some level of anonym-
218. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (quoting Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 70 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
219. CHEMERINSKYsupra note 211, at 1159.
220. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
221. See Donnelly, 465 U.S. at 694 ("Every government practice must be judged in its unique
circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.").
222. 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
223. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 870.
224. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). The Court noted:
The Constitution, moreover, demands that the school may not force this difficult choice
upon these students for it is a tenet of the First Amendment that the State cannot require
one of its citizens to forfeit his of her rights and benefits as the price of resisting confor-
mance to state-sponsored religious practice.
Id. at 312.
225. Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 312.
226. See generally id.(discussing that adolescents are susceptible to pressure regarding social
convention).
2005]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ity protected the students. The prayer may have compelled them to join
in but they were not individually encouraged to participate. In the case
of religious influence in jury deliberation rooms, some jurors may be
insisting that others obey the Bible and demand full participation in
group prayer. There is at least as much coercion in the scenario exempli-
fied in Harlan as the Court found in Sante Fe Independent School Dis-
trict because a jury is more personal.
Trial attorneys also introduce religious influence into trials.227
Ironically, in Harlan, the defense counsel that made the motion to vacate
Harlan's death sentence due to jury misconduct for bringing a Bible into
the jury deliberation room, was the same defense counsel that invoked
the Bible in closing argument.228 In closing argument, Harlan's defense
counsel referenced the Bible several times by telling the story of Abra-
ham and Isaac and mentioned Harlan's habit of reading the Bible.229
Furthermore, the defense counsel asked a juror about the biblical quote,
"eye for an eye ' '23° possibly provoking the very discussion the defense
counsel would later claim was misconduct on the level of requiring a
231new sentence. It is common for both the defense counsel and the
prosecution to invoke religion during closing arguments - "the Bible is a
favorite source for both sides. 232 The frequent presence and injection of
religion in trials raises the same question asked earlier: how much relig-
ion will the court tolerate?
Joe Freeman Britt, a notable trial attorney,233 believes that there is a
place for religion in the courtroom.23 4 He states that, "'[b]iblical refer-
ences [are] considered great works of literature .... They can be used
with caution, just as any quotation of a great work, to make a particular
point. ' ' '235 Religious tolerance in the courtroom receives varied treat-
ment from state to state.236 For example, North Carolina and Georgia
courts are not as concerned as other states with the invocation of religion
237during closing arguments. In North Carolina, the court will tolerate
the religious arguments by prosecutors as long as they do not argue "the
state law or its officers were divinely inspired., 238 Georgia does not al-
low prosecutors to suggest that religious authority mandates the death
227. See, e.g., Harlan, 109 P.3d at 635 n.3 (Rice, J., dissenting); Simson & Garvey, supra note
10, at 1110.
228. See Harlan, 109 P.3d at 619, 635 n.3.
229. See id. at 635 n.3.
230. Id.
231. See id.
232. Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1110.
233. See Hudson, supra note 136, at 14 ("[O]nce called 'the deadliest prosecutor' by the Guin-
ness Book of World Records for his success in capital cases ... .
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See Simson & Garvey, supra note 10, at 1111.
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting State v. Sidden, 491 S.E.2d 225, 231 (N.C. 1997)).
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penalty.23 9 Pennsylvania, on the other hand, "has adopted a rule that
'reliance in any manner upon the Bible or any other religious writing in
support of the imposition of a penalty of death is reversible error per se
and may subject violators to disciplinary action.,'
2 40
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court may find an establish-
ment violation where it finds an "endorsement of religion., 241 Further-
more, it has been suggested that prosecutors and public defenders are
state actors because they are employees of the state.242 If prosecutors and
public defenders make arguments that utilize biblical passages, the State
sends a message of endorsing religion. Prosecutors would in essence be
arguing that the defendant ought to go to jail, or be executed, according
to the Word of God. Allowing prosecutors to make religiously based
arguments would not only send a clear statement that our government
"endorses" and "prefers" religion over non-religion, but would erode the
wall between church and state.
Private Defense attorneys also may violate the Establishment
Clause when they invoke religion at closing argument.2 43 It is more dif-
ficult to make the argument the private defense attorneys are state actors
because they are not employees or agents of the state. However, they are
still working within the system, and the court is a state actor.244 There-
fore, if a court allows defense counsel to make, or denies objections to,
religiously based arguments, courts would in essence align themselves
with the arguments at least, "in the sense of affirming that arguments of
that type are valid and have a place in [the] courtroom., 24 5 By allowing
private defense attorneys to make religiously based arguments and by
affirming their place in the courtroom, judges, as state actors, are endors-
ing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.246
CONCLUSION
Religion is not dead in the chambers of the Colorado Supreme
Court,247 and its decision is not demeaning to people of faith.248 The
court's decision is sensitive to the individual beliefs of jurors and only
prohibits the physical presence of the Bible in the jury deliberation
room.249 As the law stands, jurors are free to discuss their own religios-
ity and personal beliefs.250 The court has simply recognized the need to
239. Id. (citing Carruthers v. State, 528 S.E.2d 217, 222 (Ga. 2000)).
240. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 599 A.2d 630, 644 (Pa. 1991)).
241. See discussion supra Part IV.





247. Contra Fein, supra note 14, at A14.
248. Contra Jurors Erred, supra note 13.
249. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616, 633 (Colo. 2005).
250. Harlan, 109 P.3d at 632.
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provide defendants sentencing decisions free from religious influence;
however, much more can be done to reach that end.
The court should provide jury instruction that clearly forbid Bibles
during jury deliberations. The instructions should also include a prohibi-
tion against group prayer, recitation of biblical passages and religiously
based arguments in favor or opposed to the death penalty. Jury instruc-
tion may not be enough, however, and death penalty sentences free from
prejudice should be a higher priority than upholding the policy consid-
erations behind Rule 606(b). Therefore, the Colorado Supreme Court
should amend Rule 606(b) so that courts can record and review jury de-
liberations, while doing everything possible to protect jurors from public
scrutiny.
Finally, allowing religion to play a role in our court system erodes
the wall between church and state. Judges, attorneys, and jurors are all
state actors in the court system and if their actions suggest an endorse-
ment of religion they are in violation of the Establishment Clause.251
Before asking if God is alive in the chambers of American courts, let us
be sure that Justice is. Justice demands that defendants receive sentences
free from religious influence.
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